Cash holdings, struktur modal, dan ekspropriasi: political connection dan efektivitas dewan komisaris sebagai moderator

Christella Gabriel Purwanto, Hendra Wijaya

Abstract


Abstract
One aspect of the agency theory suggests that controlling shareholders exploit firm’s resources for personal benefits and thus, expropriate minority shareholders. Politically-connected controlling shareholders tend to have stronger influence and control over firms. They believe the political connection that they posses may provide them a stronger and more secure position which allow them to expropriate minority shareholders. This study aims to examine and analyze the influence of cash holdings and capital structure on expropriation. Furthermore, it aims to determine the moderating impact of political connection and board of commissioners’ effectiveness toward the relationship between cash holdings and capital structure on expropriation. A multiple linear regression with moderation analysis has been applied to examine these relationships. Samples were selected through the purposive sampling method which derived a total of 71 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2017 to 2019. The study shows that both cash holdings and capital structure have no impact on expropriation. Political connection weakens the impact of cash holdings on expropriation, but has no impact on the relationship of capital structure on expropriation. Meanwhile, board of commissioners’ effectiveness has no impact neither toward the relationship between cash holdings nor capital structure on expropriation.

Abstrak
Salah satu aspek teori keagenan mengatakan bahwa pemegang saham mayoritas memanfaatkan sumber daya perusahaan untuk memperoleh keuntungan pribadi yang mengekspropriasi pemegang saham minoritas. Pemegang saham mayoritas yang terkoneksi politik cenderung memiliki pengaruh dan kontrol terhadap perusahaan yang lebih kuat. Koneksi tersebut membuat mereka merasa berada di posisi yang lebih kuat dan aman, sehingga koneksi tersebut dapat dimanfaatkan untuk mengekspropriasi pemegang saham minoritas. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji dan menganalisis pengaruh kebijakan cash holdings dan struktur modal terhadap praktik ekspropriasi serta mengetahui peran moderasi political connection dan efektivitas dewan komisaris terhadap pengaruh cash holdings dan struktur modal terhadap praktik ekspropriasi. Penelitian ini menggunakan model regresi linear berganda dengan moderasi. Penelitian berfokus pada perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) tahun 2017-2019. Sampel berjumlah 71 perusahaan yang dipilih dengan metode purposive sampling. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa cash holdings dan struktur modal tidak berpengaruh terhadap praktik ekspropriasi. Political connection memperlemah pengaruh cash holdings terhadap praktik ekspropriasi, namun tidak mempengaruhi efek struktur modal terhadap praktik ekspropriasi. Efektivitas dewan komisaris tidak mempengaruhi efek cash holdings dan struktur modal terhadap praktik ekspropriasi.


Keywords


Expropriation; Cash Holdings; Capital Structure; Political Connection; Board of Commissioners’ Effectiveness; Praktik Ekspropriasi; Struktur Modal; Efektivitas Dewan Komisaris

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17977/um004v9i12022p043

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